Evaluate whether modifications to training are needed to adequately cover open space encounters and to better support small teams, and, if so, develop and implement methods to ensure that training adequately addresses these.

[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

Establish guidance and procedures for U.S. Marshals Service staff to follow in working with the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement case workers to facilitate communication between family unit adults separated from associated family unit minors, especially parents in U.S. Marshals Service custody and their children in Office of Refugee Resettlement custody.

Work with the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement and the Department of Homeland Security to develop a formal interagency agreement (such as a memorandum of understanding) regarding the facilitation of communication between separated children in Office of Refugee Resettlement custody and their parents in U.S. Marshals Service custody.

Work with the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement and the Department of Homeland Security to develop a formal interagency agreement (such as a memorandum of understanding) regarding the facilitation of communication between separated children in Office of Refugee Resettlement custody and their parents in U.S. Marshals Service custody.

Ensure that its Correctional Services Manual includes policy on the required number of perimeter patrol vehicles at all types of institutions and implement a policy on the circumstances necessitating changes to the required number of perimeter patrol vehicles.

Establish a policy on the required assignment and use of Roving Alarm Notification System (RANS) hand-held radios.

Consider developing a national policy requiring institutional assessments of U.S. Penitentiaries (USP) on a prescribed, regular basis.

Improve the institutional assessment process by ensuring the Institutional Assessment Guidelines are comprehensive and include all necessary perimeter security aspects, ensuring the assessment reports are consistent in form and content, and requiring reviewed facilities to respond to any recommendations in the assessment reports.

Implement the preventative and detective internal controls over PGI (developing PGI spend plans, timely 90-day reviews, and quarterly headquarters examination of financial activity) as prescribed by the Department's Risk Mitigation Policy Memorandum, the AG FBI Undercover Guidelines, and the Agents Manual.

Formally determine whether the policies within the AG FBI Undercover Guidelines apply, in their entirety or in specific instances, to all DOJ law enforcement components; or if the Department must issue new guidance to govern undercover operations that are initiated by DOJ law enforcement components outside of the FBI.

Ensure that the DEA's policies reflect necessary measures and controls stipulated in applicable Department undercover guidance.

Establish controls that mitigate the risk of inmates communicating with unknown and un-vetted parties and take steps, including the utilization of available technological features as found in TRULINCS, to reduce the risk of mass emails being received by high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates.

Review cellblock conversation monitoring policy, procedures, and capabilities to determine whether and how improvements can be made to achieve security goals, including improvement of audio monitoring systems.

Revisit its social communication monitoring policy for high-risk inmates, including terrorist inmates, to better ensure that all visits between terrorist inmates and their visitors are sufficiently monitored.

[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

[Description omitted; DOJ has determined that this recommendation contains information that is limited official use or classified.]

In conjunction with the efforts to address Recommendation Number 2, examine current field office initiatives that provide an ongoing mechanism to revisit subjects of closed assessments and investigations. This examination should identify any legal, policy, and civil liberties implications so that a decision can be made as to whether all FBI field offices should undertake similar initiatives.

Ensure that the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Official cadre participates in National Level Exercises, when applicable, and ESF-13 Table Top Exercises.

Evaluate which types of Sensitive Investigative Matters (SIM) require advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General, in addition to the notifications currently required for SIMs, especially for case openings that implicate core First Amendment activity and raise policy considerations or heighten enterprise risk, and establish implementing policies and guidance, as necessary.

Evaluate which types of Sensitive Investigative Matters (SIM) require advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the Deputy Attorney General, in addition to the notifications currently required for SIMs, especially for case openings that implicate core First Amendment activity and raise policy considerations or heighten enterprise risk, and establish implementing policies and guidance, as necessary.

Address the problems with the administration and assessment of CHSs identified in the report. (see items 4a. through 4f. on pages 415 and 416)

Ensure that appropriate training on DIOG 4 is provided to emphasize the constitutional implications of certain monitoring situations and to ensure that agents account for these concerns, both in the tasking of CHSs and in the way they document interactions with and tasking of CHSs.

Require that all suspicious orders reports be sent to DEA headquarters.

Complete the heating, ventilation, and cooling equipment upgrade subproject at Metropolitan Detention Center Brooklyn and ensure that the equipment is capable of maintaining temperatures at BOP targets. Further, ensure that upgraded hardware and Building Management System software allow facilities staff to accurately monitor building temperatures and heating, ventilation, and cooling equipment performance.

Take further action to diagnose the sources of temperature regulation issues and remedy them, if the upgraded Metropolitan Detention Center Brooklyn heating, ventilation, and cooling system cannot maintain building temperatures at BOP targets.

Ensure that, in the absence of Building Management System software, institutions use a consistent and sound method to measure and document temperatures and record all maintenance performed on heating, ventilation, and cooling equipment.

Require institutions to maintain a list of inmates who use continuous positive airway pressure machines, or other electronic medical devices, in their cells so that institution staff can make every effort to accommodate those inmates in the event of a power outage.

Implement methods to accurately and completely track all foreign national sponsorship information for individual foreign nationals, including expiration dates.

Update Cyber Division Policy Guide 0853PG to include a minimum requirement for information that should be included in a victim notification and in victim notification leads, to ensure the consistency and effectiveness of victim notifications.