

U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT [REDACTED]		CASE NUMBER 2015-008197
OFFICE CONDUCTING INVESTIGATION Dallas Field Office		DOJ COMPONENT Federal Bureau of Investigation
DISTRIBUTION	STATUS	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Field Office DFO	<input type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> OPEN PENDING PROSECUTION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLOSED	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AIGINV	PREVIOUS REPORT SUBMITTED: <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Component FBI	Date of Previous Report:	
<input type="checkbox"/> USA		
<input type="checkbox"/> Other		

SYNOPSIS

b6 Per FBI and OIG
b7C Per FBI and OIG
b7D Per FBI

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation upon receipt of information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] alleging that [REDACTED] a known [REDACTED] drug trafficker, claimed to be corruptly involved with [REDACTED]

According to the allegations, [REDACTED]

The OIG learned during the investigation that [REDACTED], then-Assistant Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED], and then-Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED], failed to report the allegations against [REDACTED] to the FBI Inspection Division (INSD) and directed employees not to report the allegations to the OIG. Also during the investigation, the OIG received allegations that [REDACTED]

The OIG determined that [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]
5. [REDACTED]

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b7C Per FBI and OIG

DATE December 20, 2018	SIGNATURE [REDACTED]
PREPARED BY SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED]	
DATE December 20, 2018	SIGNATURE Monte A. Cason
APPROVED BY SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE Monte A. Cason	

Digitally signed by MONTE CASON
DN: c=US, o=U.S. Government, ou=Dept of Justice, ou=OIG, cn=MONTE CASON,
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Date: 2018.12.20 10:56:36 -0500

[REDACTED]

The OIG determined that [REDACTED] violated FBI policy when he:

1. failed to require [REDACTED] to open [REDACTED] as a CHS in view of the nature of [REDACTED] contacts with [REDACTED] and the information being provided by him,
2. failed to ensure that [REDACTED] documented his contacts and communications with [REDACTED],
3. [REDACTED]
4. [REDACTED]
5. prevented [REDACTED] from reporting allegations against [REDACTED] to the OIG or the INSD, and
6. failed to report allegations against [REDACTED] to the OIG or the INSD.

The OIG determined that [REDACTED] violated FBI policy when he:

1. failed to require [REDACTED] to open [REDACTED] up as a CHS in view of the nature of [REDACTED] contacts with [REDACTED] and the information being provided by him,
2. failed to ensure that [REDACTED] documented his contacts and communications with [REDACTED],
3. prevented [REDACTED] from reporting allegations against [REDACTED] to the OIG or the INSD, and
4. failed to report allegations against [REDACTED] to the OIG or the INSD.

[REDACTED]

OIG interviews of employees with the FBI, [REDACTED] and law enforcement sources confirmed that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] OIG reviews of FBI source reports, FBI and case reports, logs, summaries, FBI cell phone records and text messages, and emails also confirmed that [REDACTED]. The OIG interviewed [REDACTED] who said they did not favor documenting [REDACTED] as a CHS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] admitted to making the decision not to document [REDACTED] as a CHS in [REDACTED] based on [REDACTED] recommendation, and admitted granting [REDACTED] approval to continue his contact with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also admitted that he made the decision to only report the [REDACTED] corruption allegation to [REDACTED] and not to INSD, because he felt the allegation was not sufficiently corroborated. [REDACTED] admitted telling FBI personnel not to report the allegations against [REDACTED] to the OIG. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] agreed with his decision.

[REDACTED] told the OIG that he approved the decision not to document [REDACTED] as a CHS based on both [REDACTED] evaluation and [REDACTED] statement that the U.S. Attorney's Office was against it. [REDACTED] also admitted granting [REDACTED] approval to continue having contact with [REDACTED], without formal documentation. [REDACTED] stated he never denied anyone the ability to report the corruption allegation directly to the OIG, but admitted disallowing FBI

personnel from reporting the allegations against [REDACTED] directly to an OIG agent on the FBI's [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] admitted that he made the decision not to notify the INSD because he believed [REDACTED] needed to investigate the allegations further. After speaking with [REDACTED] he determined a referral to the INSD was not necessary.

[REDACTED] declined any prosecution arising from this investigation.

[REDACTED]

The OIG has completed its investigation and is providing this report to the FBI for appropriate action.

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ADDITIONAL SUBJECTS

b6 Per FBI and OIG
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[REDACTED]
Special Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation

[REDACTED]
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

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b7D Per FBI
b7E Per FBI



Predication

The Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this investigation upon receipt of information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] alleging that [REDACTED], a known [REDACTED] drug trafficker, claimed to be corruptly involved with [REDACTED]

According to the allegations, [REDACTED]

The OIG learned during the investigation that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] to report the allegations against [REDACTED] to the FBI Inspection Division (INSD) and directed employees not to report the allegations to the OIG. Also during the investigation, [REDACTED]

Investigative Process


The OIG's investigative efforts consisted of the following:

Interviews of the following FBI personnel:

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[REDACTED]
Special Agent
Special Agent in Charge
[REDACTED]

Interviews of the following DOJ personnel:



Interviews of [REDACTED]

b5 Per FBI
b6 Per FBI and OIG
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b7D Per FBI

In OIG interviews with [REDACTED], he confirmed that [REDACTED] provided useful information to the government. [REDACTED] stated that technically [REDACTED] was a government witness, but said the [REDACTED] would never have used him in any criminal case. [REDACTED] said that he [REDACTED], and [REDACTED] made a collective decision that the FBI should not open [REDACTED] as a CHS. [REDACTED] stated that the FBI made the decision to continue talking with [REDACTED], but the [REDACTED] did not tell [REDACTED] or the FBI to continue dealing with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] indicated that at the time they were using [REDACTED] as a witness, they were not aware of the extent of criminal activities in which [REDACTED] was involved. According to [REDACTED]

Interview of [REDACTED]

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Former Assistant Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED], who was [REDACTED] direct supervisor at the time of these events, maintained in his OIG interview that [REDACTED] was not a CHS and that [REDACTED] was not required to sign [REDACTED] up as a CHS. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] "did not act in a vacuum" while dealing with [REDACTED] and that "if you have a cooperating witness, if it's determined that it doesn't merit opening up a source you don't have to open him as a source." [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] had a relationship with [REDACTED] and that [REDACTED] was providing meaningful information to the FBI and to other agencies.

[REDACTED] stated that he did not recall having any conversations with [REDACTED] about opening [REDACTED] as a CHS until [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] admitted to being aware of the fact that [REDACTED] was using a source in [REDACTED], but at the time he was not aware that the source's name was [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that after the [REDACTED] allegations against [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] he gave [REDACTED] permission to continue his contact with [REDACTED] without documenting him as a CHS. [REDACTED] said he decided not to open [REDACTED] as a CHS in [REDACTED] because [REDACTED] had informed him that the [REDACTED] recommended against it. [REDACTED] did not conduct his own separate inquiry with the [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] admitted that [REDACTED] [REDACTED], he instructed [REDACTED] to document his contacts with [REDACTED] in a log book. [REDACTED] provided the OIG a copy of an email string, dated [REDACTED] between [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], where [REDACTED] informed [REDACTED] that [REDACTED] contacted him with information [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] responded by telling [REDACTED] to maintain an ongoing accurate log documenting any and all interactions with [REDACTED]

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Interview of [REDACTED]

Special Agent in Charge [REDACTED], who was [REDACTED] supervisor at the time of these events, acknowledged during his OIG interview that he received [REDACTED] written summary of his contacts with [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and approved of [REDACTED] instruction to [REDACTED] to create a log of his contacts with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] maintained that [REDACTED] was not a CHS and said he considered [REDACTED] to be more of a liaison contact for [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] commented that he was under the impression that the information [REDACTED] was logging would subsequently be entered into the FBI's Sentinel system. [REDACTED] admitted giving [REDACTED] permission to continue contact with [REDACTED] after [REDACTED] submitted his written summary.


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Interview of [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

Interview of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



OIG's Conclusions Regarding Failure to Open [REDACTED] as a CHS



The investigation determined that [REDACTED] violated FBI CHS Policy manual Section 1.1 by [REDACTED] without being opened as a CHS. [REDACTED] continued to violate the same policy in [REDACTED] after being made aware again of [REDACTED] continued use of intelligence provided by [REDACTED] for over a year and a half without opening him as a CHS.

The investigation determined that [REDACTED] violated FBI CHS Policy manual Section 1.1 in [REDACTED] was not assigned to the [REDACTED] did not have firsthand knowledge of how [REDACTED] utilized [REDACTED]. However, in [REDACTED] was provided a copy of [REDACTED] summary which outlined his use of [REDACTED] starting in [REDACTED] and his continued contact with [REDACTED] through [REDACTED]. [REDACTED], after being made aware of [REDACTED] use of intelligence provided by [REDACTED] gave [REDACTED] permission to continue having contact with [REDACTED] without opening him as a CHS.

OIG's Conclusion Regarding Failure to Document Contact and Communication with [REDACTED]

Section 3.5.2.1 (U) of the FBI CHS manual states, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] documented in an FD-302 that must be retained in the

All contacts must be

Section 4.1 (U) of the CHS manual states all communications with a CHS must be entered into the FBI's automated case management system. [REDACTED]

Section 19.3 (U) of the CHS manual states, "if information provided by the CHS is testimonial in nature or has intelligence value, it must be reported on a CHS [REDACTED] Information not obtained from the CHS's reporting must be documented in a [REDACTED]

Early in the course of the OIG investigation, the OIG conducted inquiries with the FBI and determined [REDACTED] not documented as a CHS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] violated section 3.5.2.1, 4.1 and 19.3 of the CHS manual by failing to ensure [REDACTED] documented all his contacts/communications on an FD 302 or [REDACTED] In [REDACTED] ordered [REDACTED] to document his contact and communications with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] complied by drafting a time line of his contacts and communications with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] accepted this documentation and later presented it to [REDACTED] as an explanation of [REDACTED] contact with [REDACTED] Neither [REDACTED] nor [REDACTED] followed up with [REDACTED] or anyone else to see if it was ever entered into an FBI or DOJ system.

[REDACTED] told the OIG that [REDACTED] was not a CHS and [REDACTED] was simply assisting [REDACTED] and making [REDACTED] available for interviews in [REDACTED] for [REDACTED] and other agents.

In [REDACTED] interview with the OIG, he indicated that he became aware of [REDACTED] contact with [REDACTED] in [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not believe that he allowed [REDACTED] to continue to violate FBI policy because [REDACTED] was not a CHS. [REDACTED] considered [REDACTED] to be more of a liaison contact. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] was not officially a CHS in [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] was only contacting [REDACTED] on an ad hoc basis to find out if [REDACTED] knew anything that might be helpful to the FBI.

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OIG's Conclusion

[REDACTED]

The investigation determined that [REDACTED] violated section [REDACTED] (U) of the FBI CHS manual by allowing [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] while using [REDACTED] and his information from [REDACTED].

The investigation also determined that [REDACTED] violated section [REDACTED] (U) of the FBI CHS manual by allowing [REDACTED] once he became aware of [REDACTED] contact with [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and continued to allow [REDACTED] to meet with [REDACTED] through [REDACTED].

[REDACTED]


OIG's Conclusion

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] violated section [REDACTED] (U) of the FBI CHS manual by allowing [REDACTED] while the FBI was using [REDACTED] and his information from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] violated section [REDACTED] (U) of the FBI CHS manual by allowing [REDACTED] once he became aware of [REDACTED] contact with [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] and continued to allow [REDACTED] to meet with [REDACTED] through [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



██████████ and ██████████ Prevented Employee(s) from Reporting Alleged Misconduct to the OIG

The FBI provided information to the OIG ██████████
██████████ reported that ██████████ claimed to be corruptly involved with ██████████
██████████ FBI agent later identified as ██████████

Policy Directive 0796, section 11.2 through 11.2.2 states that FBI supervisors must refer misconduct matters, in writing, to the INSD, Internal Investigation Section (IIS) upon learning of allegations of misconduct that appear to have a good-faith basis. The supervisors must advise their subordinates that employees do not have to report misconduct to their supervisors, but may instead report misconduct directly to the INSD or DOJ OIG.

OIG Interviews of ██████████ Squad

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During interviews with the OIG, ██████████ provided the following:

██████████ the FBI case agents verified there was ██████████
██████████ squad also determined that ██████████ was not a confidential informant with the FBI
██████████, and that FBI's Sentinel revealed no documented contact between ██████████ and ██████████.

Multiple ██████████ squad members, including ██████████ confirmed to ██████████ that agents on the squad inquired outside of the squad about ██████████ connections. Although ██████████ admitted speaking to ██████████ he refused to explain details about ██████████ and never identified ██████████ as a source or an informant. Long after ██████████ and the squad received allegations about a suspected illicit relationship between ██████████ and ██████████, ██████████ learned



that [redacted] was the source of the information mentioned in several investigative reports, but was never identified as such, nor indexed in any FBI systems.

As a result of the above information, on [redacted], [redacted] squad met with [redacted] and told him of all their information. [redacted] told [redacted] that he was sure [redacted] had a good explanation and suggested [redacted] contact [redacted] and [redacted] and ask them about [redacted]. [redacted] told [redacted] that he did not think that was the right way to handle the allegations about [redacted] and the [redacted]. [redacted] told [redacted] that he believed an independent agency needed to conduct the investigation and suggested contacting the DOJ OIG's office in [redacted] or FBI IIS in order to avoid a possible conflict of interest. According to [redacted], [redacted] said there was no way he was going to do that. [redacted] told the OIG that [redacted] said he had no faith or confidence that the OIG or IIS could investigate this matter properly. He said [redacted] told him he would never refer an allegation about an FBI [redacted] employee to the OIG or IIS as long as he was the ASAC of the FBI [redacted]. [redacted] stated that [redacted] claimed that most allegations against FBI employees were baseless and he accused [redacted] and members of the squad of conducting a "witch hunt" on [redacted].

[redacted] told the OIG that [redacted] told him that [redacted] was irresponsible for bringing this allegation forward, and he said that [redacted] verbally reprimanded [redacted] and told him that he and his squad should have done a better job of vetting [redacted]. [redacted] told the OIG that [redacted] said the FBI goes through a lot to make sure FBI employees are screened properly through their background process and there is no way he was making a referral against [redacted]. [redacted] said that [redacted] stated 56 other FBI Field Offices would make the referral to FBI Headquarters about [redacted], but not him. [redacted] said he attempted to explain to [redacted] that he and his squad had vetted [redacted], but he said [redacted] maintained that [redacted] and his squad should have questioned [redacted] about the allegations and not brought the allegation forward. [redacted] told the OIG that [redacted] first said he was giving [redacted] and his squad one week to obtain evidence against [redacted]. [redacted] said the case agents told him that one week was not sufficient, and that [redacted] then said he would give the agents a total of two weeks to bring back more information. [redacted] said that [redacted] told him that after the two weeks, he was going to call [redacted] into his office and question him about his relationship with [redacted]. [redacted] said he told [redacted] that he had reviewed the FBI policy and that allegations such as the one made against [redacted] should be referred to FBI Headquarters. [redacted] said that [redacted] again said as long as he was the ASAC of the FBI [redacted] that he would never refer allegations against FBI [redacted] employees to FBI Headquarters. [redacted] said that [redacted] stated he was tired of baseless and frivolous allegations being made against good employees that ruin reputations and good names. [redacted] told the OIG that he reminded [redacted] investigations were sensitive and confidential and nobody outside the squad would have access to this information. [redacted] said he further advised [redacted] that the squad had conducted several investigations in which the subjects of the investigations were exonerated and the squad always conducted these investigations in a professional manner.

[redacted] told the OIG that [redacted] stated that that if [redacted] did not agree with [redacted] decision, then he should feel free to request a meeting with [redacted]. [redacted] said that on [redacted], along with the members of the [redacted] squad, briefed [redacted] and [redacted] about the allegations concerning [redacted] and [redacted]. He said they requested [redacted] to allow [redacted] and the squad to contact the DOJ OIG's [redacted] Office about the allegations against [redacted]. According to [redacted], [redacted] stated there was a mechanism to refer complaints and that [redacted] FBI offices do not contact the DOJ OIG directly. Further, [redacted] said [redacted] stated that he supported the chain of command principle and supported [redacted] and his decisions. According to [redacted], the allegations against [redacted] and [redacted] were never referred to INSD or the DOJ OIG and [redacted] handled the allegation by [redacted] confronting [redacted].

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[redacted] told the OIG that after he and [redacted] squad notified [redacted] about their concerns regarding [redacted] contact with [redacted] on [redacted], [redacted] allowed [redacted] squad to conduct an operation [redacted] during which [redacted]

After conducting that operation [redacted] said [redacted] approved a second operation involving [redacted]

[redacted] told the OIG that during an [redacted], meeting with [redacted] present, [redacted] informed the [redacted] squad that he had questioned [redacted] about his relationship with [redacted] and as expected, [redacted] had an explanation for their relationship. He said [redacted] stated that [redacted] said he had wanted to sign [redacted] up as a confidential informant but because of his extensive involvement in criminal activity, [redacted] was not supportive of the idea. [redacted] said that [redacted] read to [redacted] and the squad from a multi-page document [redacted] had [redacted] prepare about his relationship with [redacted]

During [redacted] OIG interview, he confirmed [redacted] regarding [redacted] relationship with [redacted] from [redacted] [redacted] said that on [redacted] as a result of seeing [redacted] [redacted] had a meeting with the [redacted] squad. [redacted] said during the meeting [redacted] accused the [redacted] squad of conducting a witch hunt. [redacted] said [redacted] asked [redacted] if they could take the information regarding [redacted] to DOJ OIG and [redacted] replied, "No." [redacted] said [redacted] initially told the [redacted] squad they had one week to corroborate the information about [redacted], but they were not allowed to [redacted]. According to [redacted] [redacted] said that by the end of the meeting [redacted] extended the deadline and gave the [redacted] squad two weeks to verify the information and at the end of the two week period, [redacted] was going to confront [redacted] with the information. [redacted] said [redacted] commented that [redacted] does not always follow the rules but he gets results.

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[redacted] told the OIG that on [redacted] he attended a meeting with [redacted] and [redacted] in [redacted] office regarding the allegations against [redacted]. According to [redacted] [redacted] told [redacted] that they were on a witch hunt with baseless accusations and he did not want the [redacted] squad going to the OIG. Additionally, [redacted] said [redacted] would not allow him to look into [redacted]. [redacted] said that [redacted] told them they were just dealing with "bullshit" administrative rules. [redacted] said [redacted] gave the [redacted] squad one week, and then later extended it to two weeks, to provide proof that [redacted] was doing something illegal with [redacted].

In [redacted] OIG interview, [redacted] stated that [redacted] gave the [redacted] squad only two weeks to investigate the allegation against [redacted]. [redacted] further told the OIG that he and other members of the [redacted] squad proposed to [redacted] and then later to [redacted] that they should report the allegations against [redacted] to [redacted] OIG office and both [redacted] and [redacted] denied the request to present the allegation to the OIG. [redacted] said that he felt [redacted] and [redacted] had created a double standard when they made the decision not to open a case or to report the allegations against [redacted] to the OIG nor to the INSD, because he had opened cases on other agencies and on other law enforcement officials based on much less information than they had regarding [redacted].

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Interview of [redacted]

In [redacted] OIG interview, he admitted that during the [redacted] meeting with members of the [redacted] squad he did not allow them to refer the allegations against [redacted] to the DOJ OIG or to FBI INSD. [redacted] said that he did

not think there was anything criminal about the allegations at that time and the fact that [REDACTED] was communicating with [REDACTED] was easily explainable. [REDACTED] also admitted that he told the [REDACTED] squad that it had only two weeks to corroborate the allegations before he would confront [REDACTED]. In that two week period, [REDACTED] said that he allowed the [REDACTED] squad to conduct operations [REDACTED]. He said he felt the operations would show that the allegations against [REDACTED] were unreliable and exaggerations. [REDACTED] said he and [REDACTED] subsequently met with members of the [REDACTED] squad again and the [REDACTED] squad presented some of the reasons why they wanted to continue their investigation. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] disagreed with the [REDACTED] squad and [REDACTED] supported [REDACTED] decision to confront [REDACTED] about the allegations. [REDACTED] said he told [REDACTED] that he directed the [REDACTED] squad not to refer the allegation to the OIG and [REDACTED] agreed.

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Interview of [REDACTED]

In [REDACTED] OIG interview, he admitted that he did not want to report the allegations against [REDACTED] directly to the OIG. [REDACTED] said that he had been willing to make a proper referral if the information regarding [REDACTED] maintained that the [REDACTED] squad never brought forward an allegation and instead brought forward [REDACTED] that was associated with [REDACTED], which had come up in their normal course of duties. [REDACTED] stated that he did not feel the information at that time was sufficient to justify a referral and he wanted to “flush out” the information and see if there was something criminal or administrative about the information. [REDACTED] said that the [REDACTED] squad never said “we have an allegation of wrong doing against him.” [REDACTED] denied knowing about [REDACTED] generated by the [REDACTED] squad and approved by [REDACTED] indicating that [REDACTED] was receiving information from the person associated with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said he did not know much more than that [REDACTED] had turned up [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did not remember [REDACTED] approving a [REDACTED] squad operation [REDACTED] designed to determine if there was a basis for the allegation. [REDACTED] stated that he was not aware that [REDACTED] restricted the [REDACTED] squad from reviewing [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that he did not prevent members of the [REDACTED] squad from going to the OIG. [REDACTED] said he told the [REDACTED] squad that it was not protocol to assign the case directly to an OIG agent in their task force.

OIG’s Conclusion

The OIG investigation concluded that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] directed [REDACTED] and other members of the [REDACTED] squad not to refer serious allegations against [REDACTED] to the OIG. In doing so, they violated FBI Policy Directive 0796, section 11.2 through 11.2.2. In addition, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] violated Department regulations, and provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 27, whistleblower protection for FBI employees, that permits FBI employees to report to the OIG allegations of misconduct.

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b7D Per FBI

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Failed to Report [REDACTED] Misconduct

FBI Corporate Policy Directive 0051D, section 11.1 states, “Any allegation of misconduct or criminal conduct on the part of FBI employees must be reported in writing to the Initial Processing Unit (IPU), Internal Investigations Section, Inspection Division. The allegations may be reported via EC, email, letter, or any other written format, IPU will forward the allegations to DOJ OIG.”

During [REDACTED] OIG interview, he said that he and [REDACTED] were not in favor of notifying the OIG of the allegations against [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] stated that after the [REDACTED] squad conducted two operations [REDACTED] with negative results, he decided to confront [REDACTED] about the allegations. [REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] later provided a written summary of his interactions with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said he also interviewed [REDACTED] who corroborated the information [REDACTED] provided. [REDACTED] said he spoke to [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] contact with [REDACTED] but did not conduct any further follow up about the incidents surrounding the contacts.

During [REDACTED] OIG interview he confirmed that he had access to [REDACTED] through [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] did state that agents would meet with [REDACTED] to obtain information [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was only aware of the times that he attended the meetings and was not aware of how many times [REDACTED] met with [REDACTED].


In [REDACTED] OIG interview, he admitted that he never contacted anyone within the INSD or Headquarters Divisions about the allegations against [REDACTED] before deciding not to formally notify the INSD about the allegation. [REDACTED] said he was of the understanding that the allegations were simply that [REDACTED] and more information needed to be obtained by the [REDACTED] squad. [REDACTED] stated that he made his determination not to refer the allegations to the FBI Inspection Division after [REDACTED] had confronted [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] said that after [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] about [REDACTED] and the fact that [REDACTED] was working with the [REDACTED] he determined there did not seem to be any nefarious or criminal activity. [REDACTED] admitted that he personally never spoke with anyone at the [REDACTED] to verify their involvement with [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] also admitted that he was not aware if [REDACTED] had verified any information with [REDACTED].

b6 Per FBI and OIG
b7C Per FBI and OIG
b7D Per FBI
b7E Per FBI

OIG's Conclusion

The OIG investigation concluded that [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] violated FBI Corporate Policy Directive 0051D, section 11.1, by not reporting in writing to the INSD the allegations against [REDACTED]. Instead, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] directed the [REDACTED] squad to conduct two separate operations with a CHS, [REDACTED] in an attempt to corroborate the allegations. Ultimately, [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] decided to confront [REDACTED] with the allegations. By doing so, they effectively decided to conduct their own investigation, and thereby impacted the ability of FBI INSD and the OIG to conduct an independent investigation of the serious allegations.





b6 Per OIG
b7C Per OIG
b7D Per FBI
b7E Per FBI